

Two closely related insecure noninteractive group key establishment schemes

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7th March 2021

Abstract

Serious weaknesses in two very closely related group authentication and group key establishment schemes are described. Simple attacks against the group key establishment part of the schemes are described, which strongly suggest that the schemes should not be used.

1 Introduction

In 2020 Cheng, Hsu and Harn proposed a combined (group) membership authentication and key establishment scheme [2] — we refer to this scheme throughout as CHH. The scheme is claimed to be lightweight and hence suitable for wireless sensor networks (WSNs). An extremely similar scheme was then published by Hsu, Harn, Xia, Zhang and Zhao in early 2021 [3] — we refer to this as the HHXZZ scheme. Rather disturbingly, although the Hsu et al. paper was only submitted after the Cheng et al. paper had been accepted for publication and the two papers share two authors, the Hsu et al. paper makes no reference to the earlier work.

There is a very extensive literature on group key establishment schemes, many of which at least provide implicit authentication of the group members. The interested reader is referred to Boyd, Mathuria and Stebila [1]. It is far from clear whether, even if it was secure (and it is not, as we describe below), the two schemes offer any advantages over the state of the art, since the only comparisons provided are with schemes using public key cryptography.

In this paper we describe a serious weakness which is shared by the two schemes. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly outline the operation of the CHH scheme. An attack on the CHH scheme is described in Section 3. The HHXZZ scheme is then briefly

introduced in Section 4, and an attack is described which is almost identical to the attack on CHH. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section 5.

2 The CHH scheme

The scheme involves a universally trusted *Membership Registration Centre* (*MRC*), which provides information to each of n participating entities $\{U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n\}$. This information enables any subset of the entities to authenticate each other ‘as a group’, and also to establish a shared secret key which is not available to participating entities not in the subset. The scheme uses arithmetic in $\text{GF}(p)$, the finite field of p elements, for some prime $p > n$. No other requirements on p are specified.

The scheme has five main stages, which we next briefly enumerate. The first stage is used to set up all the participants, and is only performed once. The remaining four steps are performed whenever a subset of entities wish to authenticate and establish a shared key. The reader is directed to the Cheng et al. paper [2] for the details — the notation used below is exactly as used in that paper.

- 0. Token generation** This preliminary stage, performed once before active use of the scheme, involves the MRC generating and distributing a pair of ‘shares’ $(s_i(y), s_i(x))$ to each authorised participant U_i ($1 \leq i \leq n$), where $s_i(y)$ is a polynomial of degree $h-1$ over $\text{GF}(p)$ and $s_i(x)$ is a polynomial of degree $t-1$ over $\text{GF}(p)$, and where $h > 2t-2$.
- 1. Pairwise key generation** In this first operational stage, the members of a ‘group’, i.e. a subset $\{U_{v_1}, U_{v_2}, \dots, U_{v_m}\} \subseteq \{U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n\}$, compute pairwise secret keys $k_{i,j}$ for each other using their shares. In fact, this step could be performed just once as part of the initialisation process, since the pairwise keys will always be the same.
- 2. Group authentication** This involves the members of the group mutually authenticating each other using the pairwise secret keys $k_{i,j}$. After this step has completed each participant is confident that all members of the group agree on which entities are in the group.
- 3. Group key establishment** This involves a further exchange amongst group members, as a result of which they agree on a shared secret key. In this exchange, the value (q_{v_i}) sent by group member U_{v_i} to all other group members is separately encrypted for each group member using the appropriate pairwise shared secret key (as established in step 1). The group key is then computed as the exclusive-or of the values $q_{v_1}, q_{v_2}, \dots, q_{v_m}$ exchanged between group members.

- 4. Group key authentication** This final stage, involving yet another exchange, is designed to give assurance that all members of the group agree on the shared secret key.

In the next part of this paper we describe an attack on the final two stages of the scheme, i.e. the group key establishment and group key authentication stages.

3 An attack on CHH group key establishment

3.1 Some observations

Before describing the attack, we make some minor observations on the operation of the scheme.

- There is no direct link between the group authentication stage and the group key establishment stage, except for the set of identities of the participants in the ‘group’.
- The nature of the encryption function E used in group key establishment is not specified. We assume here that it is instantiated as authenticated encryption (to avoid attacks that might be possible if encrypted values could be manipulated).
- The scheme involves computing the bitwise-exclusive-or of values computed modulo p . We assume here that prior to applying the exclusive-or operation the values are converted from integers to bit strings.

3.2 Attack scenario, attack model and attack objective

We suppose that a set of m ($m \leq n$) participants $\{U_{v_1}, U_{v_2}, \dots, U_{v_m}\}$ have successfully completed the group authentication stage.

We further suppose that an (insider) adversary U_{v_k} ($1 \leq k \leq m$) controls the broadcast channel with respect to ‘victim’ participant U_{v_j} ($1 \leq j \leq m$, $j \neq k$), i.e. the adversary can (a) prevent messages sent by other legitimate participants from reaching U_{v_j} , and (b) send messages to U_{v_j} on this channel that appear to have come from other legitimate participants. Since the protocol makes no assumptions about the trustworthiness of the communications channels, this assumption is legitimate. Indeed, if the broadcast channel was completely trustworthy, then much of the protocol would not be needed.

The objective of the adversary is to make the victim accept a key that is different to the key that is accepted by all other members of the set

$\{U_{v_1}, U_{v_2}, \dots, U_{v_m}\}$. This would appear to negate the purpose of the group key authentication stage, which is (presumably) all about enabling all members of the ‘group’ to verify that they share the same key.

3.3 Subverting group key establishment

The adversary U_{v_k} first chooses a key K^* which it wishes the victim U_{v_j} to (wrongly) accept as the shared group key. The adversary U_{v_k} allows all messages sent by other participants to reach their destinations correctly. However, the adversary sends two different versions of its own message:

- it sends an encrypted version of the ‘correct’ value q_{v_k} to all participants U_{v_s} ($1 \leq s \leq m$) except for the victim U_{v_j} ;
- it sends an encrypted version of the value $q_{v_k} \oplus K \oplus K^*$ to the victim U_{v_j} , where K is the ‘correct’ shared group key.

Note that the adversary will need to wait until it has received all the values q_{v_i} ($i \neq k$) before it can send the value to the victim, since it must compute the group key K before sending the value.

As a result of the above steps, all participants except for the victim U_{v_j} will share the ‘correct’ group key K . However, the victim will believe that the group key is K^* . We observe in passing that:

- the adversary knows K and K^* ;
- this part of the attack does *not* require the adversary to manipulate the broadcast channel.

3.4 Breaking group key authentication

We conclude the attack by showing how the adversary can manipulate the authentication process so that all participants believe the protocol has concluded successfully. The authentication process requires each participant to broadcast $H(K||L)$ where H is a cryptographic hash function, K is the group secret key that has just been established, and L is the sum of values broadcast (in cleartext) at the beginning of the key establishment process.

To complete the attack the adversary needs to take control of the broadcast channel to and from the victim U_{v_j} . The victim will broadcast $H(K^*||L)$ — the adversary suppresses this and masquerades as the victim to broadcast $H(K||L)$. All other participants will broadcast $H(K||L)$; the adversary prevents these messages reaching the victim, and instead sends the victim ‘fake’ broadcasts of $H(K^*||L)$.

This completes the attack — all participants except the victim will believe that K is shared by the group, and the victim will believe K^* is shared by the group.

4 The HHXZZ scheme and an attack

4.1 Operation

The HHXZZ scheme is identical in operation to the CHH scheme except for step 4 (group key establishment). Even this step is very similar — the only significant difference is in how the group key is calculated from the set of values $\{q_{v_1}, q_{v_2}, \dots, q_{v_m}\}$ exchanged between group members (and how the values q_{v_i} are calculated, although this makes no difference to the attack so we ignore it here).

The HHXZZ scheme actually has two variants, one using addition and the other multiplication to combine values. In *Variant A* the group key is computed as

$$K = \sum_{i=1}^m q_{v_i} \bmod p.$$

In *Variant B* the group key is computed as

$$K = \prod_{i=1}^m q_{v_i} \bmod p.$$

4.2 Subverting group key establishment (again)

The attack scenario, model and objective are precisely the same as for the CHH protocol. We first describe the attack for Variant A.

As previously, the adversary U_{v_k} chooses a key K^* which it wishes the victim U_{v_j} to (wrongly) accept as the shared group key. The adversary U_{v_k} allows all messages sent by other participants to reach their destinations correctly. However, the adversary sends two different versions of its own message:

- it sends an encrypted version of the ‘correct’ value q_{v_k} to all participants U_{v_s} ($1 \leq s \leq m$) except for the victim U_{v_j} ;
- it sends an encrypted version of the value $q_{v_k} + K + K^* \bmod p$ to the victim U_{v_j} , where K is the ‘correct’ shared group key.

As a result of the above steps, all participants except for the victim U_{v_j} will share the ‘correct’ group key K . However, the victim will believe that the

group key is K^* . As previously, this part of the attack does *not* require the adversary to manipulate the broadcast channel.

The attack for Variant B is exactly the same except that the adversary sends an encrypted version of the value $q_{v_k} \times K^{-1} \times K^* \bmod p$ to the victim U_{v_j} , where K is the ‘correct’ shared group key, and K^{-1} is the multiplicative inverse of K modulo p (which is easily computed using the Euclidean Algorithm).

Breaking the group key authentication step uses exactly the same procedure as for the CHH scheme.

5 Concluding remarks

We have demonstrated simple attacks which completely negate the security objectives of the protocols. This means that the protocols should not be used.

Fundamentally, the fact that the authors have not provided rigorous proofs of security for the schemes means that attacks such as those described here remain possible. It would have been more prudent to follow established wisdom and only publish schemes of this type if rigorous security proofs had been established. Similar remarks apply to the all-too-often misconceived attempts to fix broken schemes, unless a proof of security can be devised for a revised scheme. Achieving this in an efficient way seems difficult for these schemes.

Finally, we observe that the two papers are extremely similar and build on precisely the same (flawed) ideas. The ethical issues raised by this are not discussed further here.

References

- [1] C. Boyd, A. Mathuria, and D. Stebila, *Protocols for authentication and key establishment*, 2nd ed., Information Security and Cryptography, Springer, 2020.
- [2] Q. Cheng, C. Hsu, and L. Harn, *Lightweight noninteractive membership authentication and group key establishment for WSNs*, *Mathematical Problems in Engineering* **2020** (2020), no. 1452546.
- [3] C. Hsu, L. Harn, Z. Xia, M. Zhang, and Z. Zhao, *Non-interactive integrated membership authentication and group arithmetic computation output for 5G sensor networks*, *IET Commun.* **15** (2021), no. 2, 328–336.